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While Thoreau urged simplicity in all facets of life, his words
can be given here as the battle cry of the many advocates of plain
language. Others, many others, besides the hermit of Walden Pond
or frustrated English teachers, are insisting on simple, clear, easily
understood prose. In 1978 President Carter ordered federal agen-
cies to make their regulations "as simple and clear as possible."'
Many agencies now employ consultants, if not fuiltime editors, to
clean up the mess of unreadable government documents.2 Finan-
cial institutions are reshaping their standardized forms into plain
language format-and then bragging about it in all-too plain ad-
vertisements.3 Law firms hire editors to prune their associates'
prose; judges attend seminars on how to simplify their written
opinions; public interest groups and research organizations spring
up under banners like "Plain Talk, Inc." and "Simply Stated."4
Further, in what is the surest proof that a movement has gathered
momentum, corporations are being formed that will rewrite any
document, large or small, warranty clause or commercial lease, for
only a small fee.5
Much of the clamor for plain language was originally regarded
by the legal and business communities as little more than right-
minded talk. No one denounced the goals, but few took seriously
* Department of English, U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY, ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND.
1. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978).
2. See Gildea, Regulation English, To Put it Simply, Washington Post, Mar. 28, 1978,
§ B, at 1, col. 1; see also R. FLESCH, How To WRrT PLAIN ENGLISH 2 (1979).
3. Givens, The 'Plain English' Law, 50 N.Y. ST. B.J. 479 (1978).
4. Auerbach, Why Can't Lawyers Talk Like Us?, Washington Post, Jan. 15, 1978, § A,
at 38, col. 1; Auerbach, Legal Firms Turn to Editors to Clear Up Language, id., Nov. 8,
1978, Auerbach, Lawyers: The Fight Rages On For Clear Documents, id., Feb. 5, 1979, § C,
at 1, col. 9.
5. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 1, 1979, § 4, at 11, col. 3.
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the enthusiasm the issue could generate. Consumer protection, the
ground in which plain language is rooted, has always had a vein of
"anti-legalese" running through it, but few thought anyone would
try to "legislate the style of society's prose."8 Thus, when New
York Assemblyman Peter Sullivan introduced a "Plain English"
statute, few expected it to pass. Little opposition was raised
against it, however, and, in August, 1977, Governor Carey signed
the Sullivan Act7 into law, requiring that certain consumer con-
tracts be "written in a clear and coherent manner using words with
common and every day meanings."8 Right-minded talk had become
the law of the nation's leading commercial state.
Perhaps because few believed the Sullivan Act would pass, ini-
tial objections to it were not thoughtfully formulated.9 Most com-
plaints were typical of reactions against all new consumer protec-
tion legislation: consumers do not really want such a law; it will
increase litigation and clog the courts; only lawyers will benefit; it
is a hoax on consumers; it violates fundamental freedoms to con-
tract and of free speech; it is anti-business, too costly to imple-
ment, and, anyway, it is being done voluntarily. 10 Disclaimers even
appeared on contracts warning that "[n]o representation is made
that this form of contract ...complies with [the plain English
law] .,1
The dust stirred by the New York controversy should not be
allowed to obscure the genuinely important issues raised by plain
6. These were the words used by New Jersey's Gov. Byrne when he refused to sign the
state's first plain language statute, N.J. Assembly Bill No. 536 (1979). N.Y. Times, Mar. 9,
1980, § 11, at 3, col. 1. A later bill, N.J. Assembly Bill No. 1860 (1980), was signed into law
by the Governor on October 16, 1980. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56: 12 (West Supp. 1981-1982).
7. Originally, N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (b) and (c) (McKinney 1978). Renumbered
in 1978 as N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). See Appendix for
full text of the Sullivan Act.
8. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (a) (1) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
9. See Givens, supra note 3, at 480.
10. See Segull, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1978, at 32, col. 6; Friedman,
Letter to the Editor, id., May 1, 1978, at 20, col. 5; Goldstein, The Plain-Language Move-
ment Is Gaining, id., Aug. 21, 1977, § 4, at 8, col. 1; Safire, Legalesey Does It, id., July 28,
1977, at 29, col. 1; Supplementary material from: N.Y. Times News Service and Associated
Press, Nov. 2, 1978, at 19 (published during printers' strike). A particularly fervent anti-
consumer argument is made by Prather, In Defense of the People's Use of Three Syllable
Words, 39 ALA. LAW. 394 (1978).
11. Title Guarantee of New York, standard contract form, quoted in Bigoski &
Frangie, Legalese, Schmegalese: California Law in Plain English, L.A. DAILY J. REP., Sept.
14, 1979, at 14.
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language statutes. As the desire for understandable contracts solid-
ifies into statutory regulation, it becomes essential to consider
carefully the problems raised by its codification. To determine
what legal and linguistic standards are being applied to written
documents, and what problems these standards raise, Part I of this
essay will examine typical plain language legislation, Part II will
explore a sample drafting problem in order to assess in pragmatic
terms the goals of plain language statutes, and, finally, Part Ill will
examine certain theoretical issues underlying plain language and
the law.
I. A tale should be judicious, clear, succinct; The language plain,
and incidents well-link'd.
-WILLIAM COWPER, CONVERSATION (1782)
Five states have passed statutes applying Cowper's poetic ad-
vice to the more mundane language of consumer contracts."2 The
number of states with plain language legislation is in flux, as bills
work their way through state legislatures to be passed or rejected.
Thirty-nine states have at least considered plain language legisla-
tion in some version or other.'3
In the discussion which follows, primary attention will be paid
to those statutes actually in effect, though provisions of bills and
model statutes proposed by various commentators will be consid-
ered where appropriate. New York's Sullivan Act will be studied as
12. The five states are New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Maine and Hawaii. See
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981) (enacted 1977; effective Nov. 1,
1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-151 (West Supp. 1981) (enacted 1979; effective July 1,
1980); HAWAn.REv. STAT. § 487A-1 (Supp. 1980) (enacted 1980; effective July 1, 1981); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1121 (1980) (enacted 1979; effective July 5, 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN.
56:12 (West Supp. 1981-1982) (enacted and effective Oct. 16, 1980, but inoperative for two
years with regard to insurance contracts and one year for all other contracts).
13. See the Maryland Plain Language Study Committee's national survey of plain lan-
guage legislation, Plain Language Legislation in the United States, in REPORT OF THE PLAIN
LANGUAGE STUDY COMMITTEE (Mar., 1980) [hereinafter cited as National Survey, MARYLAND
REPORT]. The Committee's proposals were embodied in Maryland House Bill No. 1604
(1981), which failed to pass. I am grateful to Ms. Claudine Allen, Staff Counsel to the Plain
Language Study Committee, for making the MARYLAND REPORT available for the present
essay.
For discussions of various state statutes, see Bigolski & Frangie, supra note 11; NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LEGISLATVE REPORT Vol. 4, No. 3 (July 15,
1979); P. TILL & A. GARGIULO, CONTRACTS: THE MovE TO PLAIN LANGUAGE (1979); and
Semegen, Plain Language Legislation, 85 No. 1 CASE AND COMMENT 42 (Jan.-Feb. 1980).
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the typical statute, both because it was the first passed and be-
cause most state bills have been modeled on it.14 The statutes will
be examined in terms of three kinds of provisions: the coverage
provisions, the enforcement mechanisms, and the standards by
which plain language is defined.
A. Coverage
Nearly all proposed statutes place limits on the written docu-
ments required to be in plain language. These limits are generally
established by type of document and by monetary maximums to
the transaction affected. Other miscellaneous exclusions are some-
times specified.
That consumer protection underlies plain language legislation
is clear in New York's limitation by type to all "written agree-
ments ... for the lease of space to be occupied for residential pur-
poses, or to which a consumer is a party and the money, property
or service [involved in the transaction] is primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes."15 Even though no explicit defini-
tion of "consumer" or "personal, family, or household purposes" is
included in the statute, no special controversies involving these
definitions are likely to arise since this is also the language of the
U.C.C.116
14. Insurance readability statutes, considered in the present essay as a subcategory of
plain language legislation in general, have fared better than the broader statutes covering
consumer contracts. Of 25 states considering insurance readability regulations, 17 have
passed them; of 31 states considering consumer contract statutes, only 6 have passed them
(and one of these awaits a second reading). Three states with consumer contract statutes
(Connecticut, Maine, and New Jersey) have separate insurance statutes as well. National
Survey, MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 13. Only New York has seriously considered incorpo-
rating insurance policies under a blanket plain language statute. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1979,
§ B, at 5, col. 2.
15. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981) (emphasis added).
16. See, e.g., N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-109 (1) (McKinney 1964). One commentator has argued
that the statute places the burden of determining whether the intended use of the money,
goods, or services is "personal" on the lender or seller. Semegen, supra note 13, at 43. The
New York Law Revision Commission seeks to require actual knowledge of personal use
before a lender would be liable. Memorandum of the Law Revision Commission Relating to
the Clarification of Plain Language Requirements for Certain Consumer Agreements, 1979
Leg. Doc. No. 65 (A), reprinted in McKINNEY'S 1979 SESsioN LAWS OF NEW YORK, 1443
[hereinafter cited as Memorandum of the Law Revision Commission]. Besides New York's,
few other statutes attempt to define "consumer." For a discussion of whether small business
enterprises should be included under "consumer," see Comment, Plain English Contracts:
The Demise of Legalese?, 30 BAYLOR L. REv. 765, 774 (1978).
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While only a few statutes list the types of contracts covered,
the documents contemplated are loan agreements, contracts for the
purchase of goods and services, and leases. Expressly excluded in
some bills are documents with traditionally arcane lan-
guage-mortgages, deeds, securities transactions, and insurance
policies.17 Maine's statute covers only loan contracts, and further
stipulates that only loan contracts that have been "substantially
prepared in advance of a consumer loan" are covered.18 As this
wording suggests, the statutes are aimed primarily at standardized
form contracts. When a statute is silent on this issue, however, in-
dividually tailored contracts are usually covered as well.19
Documents other than contracts have also come under the
scrutiny of plain language advocates. New York has considered
bills similar to the Sullivan Act covering amendments, rules and
regulations, and certain public notices.2 0 A proposed District of Co-
lumbia bill would have applied to government documents gener-
ally, including jury instructions and court opinions.2 1 Michigan's
proposed bill (which also did not pass) would have covered any
"written communication [prepared by a public employee] which is
intended for public consumption or is available for public
inspection.
2 2
The second principle for limiting coverage is a maximum
transaction amount. The Sullivan Act includes only transactions of
$50,000 or less, effectively ruling out many purchases of residential
property. Lenders, many of whom oppose plain language legisla-
tion, predictably urge low limits to restrict the statute's applicabil-
ity, because "the greater the amount in jeopardy advanced on the
loan, the greater the need for exacting language to preserve the
lender's remedies. 2 3 Connecticut weakens its otherwise strict defi-
nition of plain language by covering transactions only up to
17. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-153 (b) (West Supp. 1981).
18. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1122 (1) (West 1980).
19. See Comment, The Plain English Law: "Let the Buyer Be Aware," 23 N.Y. L. SCH.
L. REV. 824, 827 (1978).
20. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 4-108 (1) (d), (2) (McKinney 1978); N.Y. Senate Bill No. 5446
(1979). See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1978, at 69, col. 2; id., May 18, 1978, § 2, at 2, col. 3.
21. Bill introduced (and subsequently defeated) in the Council of the District of Co-
lumbia, entitled The Plain Language Act of 1979.
22. Michigan Senate Bill No. 96 § 2 (1979).
23. Semegen, supra note 13, at 44.
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$25,000.24 Some statutes, however, have maximum amounts higher
than New York's in order to include residential sales contracts.25
Whether mortgages, as well as real estate sales contracts, are cov-
ered by a statute otherwise silent on the matter may well depend
on the monetary limit, and on whether interest as well as principal
is treated as part of the transaction amount.26
Two New York City Civil Court cases have dealt with a lim-
ited issue of coverage: whether the plain language law covers leases
renewed after the statute's effective date, or only new leases. In
Francis Apts. v. McKittrick,2 7 a non-payment proceeding, a defen-
dant tenant moved that the plaintiff landlord be ordered to pro-
vide a renewal lease rewritten in plain English as defined by the
Sullivan Act. The Code of the Rent Stabilization Association of
New York requires that leases offered for renewal contain "the
same conditions [except for rent] as the expiring lease;" 28 the code
was amended in April, 1979, to allow tenants to request plain Eng-
lish renewal, leases, and to ensure that the plain English version
did not take away any of the tenants' rights.2" The court in Francis
Apts. granted the tenant's motion,30 rejecting the decision in New-
port Apts. v. Collins,31 a case decided only ten days earlier by a
different judge of the same Civil Court. In Newport Apts., the
court held that renewal leases were not covered by the Sullivan Act
because such coverage would put the landlord to the excessive bur-
24. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-151 (b) (2) (A) & (B) (West Supp. 1981).
25. New Jersey exempts "consumer contracts involving real estate or insurance" from
its $50,000.00 limit. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-9. A California model statute proposed by
Bigolski & Frangie, supra note 11, at 17, has a limit of $200,000.00. The Maryland Plain
Language Study Committee, see note 13 supra, proposed a bill with no monetary limits.
Maryland House Bill No. 1604 (1981).
26. See Comment, supra note 19, at 828.
27. 104 Misc. 2d 693, 429 N.Y.S.2d 516 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1979).
28. Section 60 of the Code of the Rent Stabilization Association of New York City,
quoted in Francis Apts. v. McKittrick, 104 Misc. 2d 693, 694, 429 N.Y.S.2d 516, 517 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. 1979).
29. Id. The New York State Consumer Protection Board found as of November, 1979,
that most leases in the City still violated the Sullivan Act, and that the "few leases that did
conform to the requirement forced tenants to surrender almost every right given to them
under state law." N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1979, § 2, at 3, col. 3. Plain contractual language may
"create the undesireable effect of weakening the rights of the lender [or landlord]."
Semegen, supra note 13, at 42.
30. 104 Misc. 2d at 697, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
31. N.Y.L.J., May 16, 1979, at 13, col. 3 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. April 11, 1979), rev'd, 103 Misc.
2d 994, 431 N.Y.S.2d 231 (App. Term 1980).
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den of rewriting each lease, and the tenant to the burden of metic-
ulously examining each clause to determine if the new version con-
tained the "same conditions" as the original lease.32 In Francis
Apts., the court held that renewal leases were covered by the Sulli-
van Act, saying that the reasoning in Newport was "specious" and
counter to the purposes of the plain English law:
[T]he state law ... is quite specific and unambiguous as to which agree-
ments are to be affected by the plain English requirement... [T]his court
cannot conclude that the legislature of our state did not consider nor were
they unaware that a great proportion of residential leases in the City of New
York pertained to stabilized tenants and that it was intended that they be
the recipients of the protections afforded to them by the requirements of
plain English.-s
Initially, the applicability of the Sullivan Act may prove a fer-
tile ground for litigation, as consumers attempt to force businesses
to comply with the statute, and as particular sellers, landlords, or
lenders seek to avoid coming under the statute's purview. Once
courts resolve these questions of the Act's applicability, however,
the issues raised by its enforcement provisions and by the criteria
for plain language will become more crucial in litigation.
B. Enforcement Provisions
Because plain language legislation ultimately seeks to reform
contracts rather than to punish wrongdoers, typical enforcement
provisions are likely to prove more irritating to businesses than
debilitating. New York's Sullivan Act, deemed weak by some com-
mentators,3 4 permits suits by consumers for "actual damages sus-
tained plus a penalty of fifty dollars. ' 5 Class actions are allowed
but are limited to a total penalty of $10,000. The Act does not pro-
32. Id. The change in the Code of the Rent Stabilization Association of New York,
supra note 28, was made subsequent to the trial in Newport Apts. Co. v. Collins, 103 Misc.
2d at 995, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 232. The lack of a specific recognition of the Sullivan Act's appli-
cability to rent controlled leases explains the apparent inconsistency with which the trial
judge felt himself faced. In reversing the Newport Apts. Co. decision, the Appellate Term
court noted that the Code amendment "was made retroactive to the effective date of section
5-702 of the General Obligations Law in recognition of the fact that this statute applies to
renewal leases of rent stabilized tenants." 103 Misc. 2d at 995, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
33. 104 Misc. 2d at 696, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 518. See also Comment, supra note 19, at 830,
for a discussion of the possible conflict with the Rent Stabilization Code.
34. See Bigolski & Frangie, supra note 11, at 16.
35. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
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vide for recovery of attorney fees or costs, an absence that may
deter private actions.3 6 Other proposed statutes have higher speci-
fied penalties, the highest being $2,500 in the California Model
Statute. The proposed California statute does not, however, allow
suits for actual damages.3 7 The greatest potential monetary pen-
alty was provided for in the District of Columbia bill which, if
passed, would have permitted punitive damages up to 25% of ac-
tual damages (these additional damages being limited to
$50,000).23 Most statutes, unlike New York's, have provisions for
recovering fees and costs along with penalties or damages.39 New
Jersey adds fees and costs to provisions otherwise identical to New
York's, while Connecticut allows a penalty of $100 plus up to $100
for attorney fees.40 The Sullivan Act may be much stronger, how-
ever, than its low monetary penalty suggests. It does not appear to
place a limit on the actual damages recoverable in class action suits
(only on the penalties),41 and it authorizes New York's attorney
general to seek injunctive relief and administrative costs against an
offending company.
42
An action for damages presumably can be instituted irrespec-
tive of injury resulting from the contract's violation of the statute.
Although recovery of damages requires injury, determination of ac-
tual damages raises a problem of definition. Neither the New York
law, nor any other state's statute, specifies whether the damages
sustained must be caused by that portion of the contract not in
plain language, or whether the presence in the contract as a whole
of any provision not in plain language is sufficient for a claim. If
the "security interest" provisions of a consumer installment
purchase agreement are "clear and coherent and appropriately
captioned," but the "prepayment" clause contains words that do
not have "common and everyday meanings" (such as "the Rule of
78s" or even "rebate"), may a consumer sue for damages resulting
36. Bigolski & Frangie, supra note 11, at 14. See Comment, supra note 16, at 771 n.45,
for a suggestion that attorney fees may be recoverable as actual damages.
37. Bigolski & Frangie, supra note 11, at 18.
38. The Plain Language Act of 1979, supra note 21, § 503 (B) (iii).
39. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-3 (West Supp. 1981-1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-154 (West Supp. 1981).
40. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-3 (West Supp. 1981-1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-154
(West Supp. 1981).
41. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (a) (2) (West Supp. 1981-1982).
42. Id. § 5-702 (c).
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from the repossession of her stereo equipment? Because the stat-
utes speak of "agreements" or "contracts" as entities, it would
seem that an obscure provision anywhere in the document could
open the door to litigation.43
In addition to consumer actions and injunctive relief, another
common enforcement mechanism is regulation by some state
agency. Insurance readability statutes require a policy to conform
to readability standards as a condition for approval by the state's
insurance commissioner. 4 Violation of Maine's plain language stat-
ute, which applies only to consumer loan agreements, makes a
lender liable for penalties under other statutes regulating "super-
vised lenders. ' 45 The Maine statute permits sellers to submit their
form contracts in advance to the appropriate state agency for a
determination of the contract's compliance with plain language cri-
teria.48 Presumably a business could raise this approval as a de-
fense against a claim that a consumer failed to understand the con-
tract's provisions.
The strictest potential enforcement mechanism, suggested in
only two proposed statutes, is to render the offending contract un-
enforceable. Michigan's proposal provided that "a corporation
shall not enter into a contract with an individual if the contract
was prepared by the corporation but cannot be understood by a
person of average intelligence. . . .",4 It further provided that "a
contract which violates the statute may not be enforced in any ac-
tion against a person who entered the contract" if the alleged
breach was related to a failure to understand the contract's
terms.48 The District of Columbia proposal permitted a court to
order "[a]ction against the document" prohibiting its use, or to or-
der a complaining party released either from the entire contract or
from the provision not in plain language.49 Except for these two
bills, however, plain language legislation generally avoids disman-
43. See Comment, supra note 16, at 771.
44. See, e.g., the Massachusetts insurance clear language statute, MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 175, § 2 B (1) (West 1980). Many insurance readability statutes authorize the in-
surance commissioner to lower plain language standards if he deems it necessary. See, e.g.,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2443 (West Supp. 1980-1981).
45. ME. REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 10, § 1125 (West 1980).
46. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 10, § 1126 (1) (West 1980).
47. Michigan Senate Bill No. 96, § 3 (1979).
48. Id., § 5.
49. The Plain Language Act of 1979, supra note 21, § 503 (A).
19811
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tling contractual obligations. Some statutes prohibit raising a vio-
lation of plain language requirements as a defense in an action to
enforce or for breach; New York's statute, for example, provides
that "violation ... shall not render [the agreement] void or
voidable.
'50
Some commentators, especially those opposed to plain lan-
guage legislation, have suggested various protections for sellers,
such as the insertion of model form contracts into the statute it-
self, elimination of private lawsuits by consumers, short time peri-
ods in which suits may be brought, and elimination of presump-
tions of construction in favor of consumers. 1 Most plain language
statutes exempt wording required by state or federal laws (disclo-
sures required by the Truth in Lending Act,62 for example) even
though these laws are not always plainly worded. Some statutes
remove liability toward certain consumers, such as those repre-
sented by counsel, those who prepared the contract in question, or
even those who can be shown to have understood the contract.53
By far the two most important buffers against enforcement are
the removal of liability when the contract has been performed, and
the good faith defense. The first seems reasonable to the extent
that performance implies understanding and acceptance by the
parties. Terminating liability upon performance, however, does di-
minish the protection afforded consumers, since a consumer might
be obligated to be in breach (or potential breach) of the contract in
order to assert a claim that he or she could not comprehend the
contract's terms. Further, a consumer may not know that he or she
50. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (b). Notwithstanding this provision, however, the
defendant in both Newport Apts. Co. v. Collins, N.Y.L.J., May 16, 1979, at 13, col. 3 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. April 11, 1979) and Francis Apts. v. McKittrick, 104 Misc. 2d 693, 429 N.Y.S.2d
516 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1979), were permitted to move, as part of their defenses in nonpayment
proceedings, that the plaintiff landlord be required to provide plain English renewal leases.
The cases do not discuss how these defense motions are to be squared with the Sullivan Act.
Some statutes prohibit contract provisions that waive the consumer's rights under the
plain language law. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-11 (West Supp. 1981-1982). Counterclaims
are permitted in some proposed statutes. Maryland House Bill No. 194 (1981). See also
Givens, supra note 3, at 481.
51. See Semegen, supra note 13 at 47-48; Comment, supra note 16, at 781. Florida's
proposed statute contains an anti-harassment provision to protect businesses from excessive
litigation. Florida House Bill No. 40 § 501.145 (2) (1980).
52. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146.
53. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-155 (d) & (e) (West Supp. 1980). See also the
proposals in the Memorandum of the Law Revision Commission, supra note 16.
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miscomprehended a provision until performance has been com-
pleted. Traditional safe deposit box rental contracts, for example,
usually contain obscure clauses exempting the bank from liability
for allowing certain "unauthorized persons" into the box. The per-
son renting the box may, however, discover that such an unautho-
rized party has opened the box; yet if the rental fee has been paid
and the rental period ended by the time discovery is made, it could
be held that "performance" precluded bringing an action under
the plain language statute. Or, to take another example, an install-
ment credit agreement may be unclear as to the amount of finance
charge refundable upon prepayment; yet if the consumer does pre-
pay, and then receives a rebate smaller than he believes his due, he
may be found to have "performed" and thus be precluded from
bringing an action under the plain language statute. Either the
consumer must refuse to perform-a refusal that is unlikely if the
consumer believes he does understand the contract-or he must
counterclaim in a suit for breach brought by the stronger party.
This exclusion of performing parties may protect businesses from
harassment and may estop consumers who clearly do understand
their contracts; but "performance" may itself become an issue in
litigation brought on plain language grounds.
The good faith defense appears in virtually every proposed
statute, and finds support even among the staunchest advocates of
plain language legislation." Evidence of good faith includes the
employment of experts to rewrite contracts, instructions to con-
tract writers that they use plain language, and actual changes
made in documents, even if these changes do not achieve plain lan-
guage. It is not clear, however, against which actions the New York
statute allows the good faith defense to be asserted. The wording
of the statute seems to permit the defense in a suit for penalties,
but not in a suit for damages.5 5 The New York Attorney General
has argued that the good faith defense "is not directly applicable
to a proceeding brought by the state" under the Sullivan Act.5,
54. See Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Em-
pirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REv. 841, 904-
905 (1977).
55. The statute provides: "[N]or shall any creditor, seller or lessor who attempts in
good faith to comply with this subdivision be liable for such penalties." N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW, § 5-702 (a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981) (emphasis added). See Givens, supra note 3,
at 505; Friedman, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1979, § 3, at 14, col. 3.
56. Affidavit, dated June 16, 1980, of Stephen Mindell, New York assistant Attorney
1981]
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The basis for this argument appears to be the separation, in the
statute, of the good faith provision from the provision allowing the
state to seek injunctive relief.
Although New York's plain language law has been in effect
only since Nov. 1, 1978, it already appears that it will be a factor in
litigation in ways that go beyond its own enforcement. One action
initiated by New York state sought direct enforcement of the Act's
provisions by requiring an offending bank to pay costs and to re-
write the contract at issue. The state's attorney general has also
raised the statute in an action brought, in part, on plain language
grounds as a lever for gaining access to a company's files, claiming
that the company's contracts did not comply with plain English
requirements. In another case, a private action for damages
caused by a company's alleged negligence, a plaintiff used the stat-
ute's criteria successfully against an exculpatory clause in a con-
tract.5 9 There, the court cited the Sullivan Act as one standard by
which such clauses could be judged effective or not: "[T]he law de-
mands . . . that such provisions [relieving a party of liability for
negligence] be clear and coherent."60 As mentioned earlier, the
statute has also been invoked defensively by tenants seeking to in-
validate their leases."1
New York may have chosen wisely in keeping its penalty pro-
visions relatively mild and in tilting the statute's emphasis toward
General, submitted with New York State's Petition in State v. Lincoln Savings Bank (Sup.
Ct., N.Y. County 1980). The State's case against the Bank was dismissed when the Bank
rewrote a complex contract form for safety deposit box rentals.
57. State v. Lincoln Savings Bank (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1980) (dismissed).
58. Siegel, "Plain English" Results, N.Y. Times, April 1, 1979, § 3, at 1, col. 5. The case
involved, inter alia, allegations that the defendant, a storage company, used contracts which
violated N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-702. A portion of the allegedly offending contract read:
Received, subject to classification and tariffs, rules and regulationg in effect on
the date of the issue of this Bill of Lading shipment describe herein (contents
and conditions of contents of packages unknown) consigned and destined as
shown herein, which said company (the word company being understood
throughout this contract as meaning any person or corporation in possession of
the property under the contract) agrees to transport to destination indicated
below.
Id.
59. Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 400 N.E.2d 306, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1979).
60. Id. at 108, 400 N.E.2d at 309, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
61. See Newport Apts. Co., N.Y.L.J., May 16, 1979, at 13, col. 3 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. April 11,
1979), rev'd, 103 Misc. 2d 994, 431 N.Y.S.2d 231 (App. Term 1980), and Francis Apts., 104




state action. Plain language statutes should be framed as regula-
tory acts designed to reform contracts rather than punish offend-
ers. The best incentive to comply may well be the threat of direct
injunctions requiring that documents be rewritten.2
C. Standards for Plain Language
While coverage and enforcement of plain language statutes
raise specific issues that are certain to bring about litigation, they
do not raise conceptual difficulties as significant as do the stan-
dards by which language is determined to be "plain." It is easy
enough to enumerate the criteria used in various statutes, but it is
more difficult and more important to distinguish the assumptions
that underlie notions of what constitutes "plain." The statutes
jumble different types of criteria together in a manner that often
hides rather than reveals what is at stake for the drafter, the con-
sumer, and for theories of legal language.
"Plain" can have three distinguishable meanings when applied
to a written document. Every document is, first, a physical object
that the reader must perceive, thus "plain" can refer to legibility,
or the ease with which a document's printed language can be read.
Second, every document arranges language in a certain order or
sequence, thus "plain" can refer to coherence, or the manner in
which a document's parts relate to one another. Third, a document
contains words and sentences that vary in their degree of intelligi-
bility, thus "plain" can refer to the semantic clarity, or the degree
to which readers can comprehend the language. Of course these
meanings of "plain" are mutually dependent. It is difficult to un-
derstand either an illegible document or a document containing
nonsensical words or sentences, even if printed in boldface type
and carefully numbered in sequence. These distinctions are crucial,
however, if valid judgments about language are to made, for the
more emphasis a statute places on legibility and the less on seman-
tic clarity, the easier that statute is to comply with but the less
effective it will be in protecting consumers from obscure terms un-
favorable to their interests. In other words, the more quantifiable
the criteria used to define plain language, the less effective a stat-
62. The Bill proposed by the Maryland Plain Language Study Committee, supra note
13, went even further in this direction, leaving all enforcement to the state, and permitting
no private lawsuits. Maryland House Bill No. 1604 § 14-1403; § 14-1404 (3) (1981).
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ute may prove in reforming, in any meaningful way, obscure stan-
dardized contracts.
Legibility involves such matters as type size, quality of print,
size of margins, color of paper and its contrast with print, tech-
niques of emphasis (underlining or boldface, for example), or any
other method of printing that affects the reader's ability to recog-
nize printed words on a page. The justifiably bad reputation of
"fine print" induced states, long before the plain language move-
ment, to require certain minimum type sizes. The increased skill of
typographers in producing small type has, in fact, been cited as
one cause for the increased complexity of consumer contracts. 3
Most insurance readability statutes emphasize legibility by requir-
ing at least eight or ten point type, and by prohibiting "undue
prominence" for any section." Connecticut's statute includes spe-
cific objective criteria for sufficient legibility, such as margins of at
least one-half inch and spacing between paragraphs of 3/16 inch. 5
Such matters are easily measurable, and it is only common sense
that proper spacing, print size, margins, etc., increase legibility.!"
The standards must be carefully thought out and tested, however,
because some printing techniques work against others. Visually
prominent terms like FINANCE CHARGE (as required by the
Truth in Lending Act) often clutter a page with dramatic BOLD-
FACE TYPE, creating a kind of Sesame Street effect.
Coherence is less amenable to measurement than is legibility.
New York's standard, adopted in most statutes, is that the agree-
ment must be "appropriately divided and captioned by its various
sections. '6 7 This is a rather rubbery yardstick: what are the divi-
sions and captions supposed to be "appropriate" to? Internal con-
sistency? Importance to the consumer? Likelihood of breach?
Some statutes add the words "logical" or "logical sequence" to this
criterion, but these merely restate the problem.68 The more crucial
63. P. TELL & A. GARGIULO, supra note 13, at 21.
64. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 175, § 2B (1) (b), (c) (West 1980).
65. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-152 (c) (8) and (9) (West Supp. 1980).
66. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 16, at 774 n.56. The author wonders why the Sulli-
van Act does not have provisions for minimum print size.
67. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (a) (2) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
68. The proposed legislation drafted by the Maryland Plain Language Study Commit-
tee, supra note 13, required that a consumer contract be "[o]rganized in logical sequence
and divided into appropriate sections." Maryland House Bill No. 1604 § 14-1402 (A) (2)
(1981). One commentator interprets "appropriately divided and captioned by its various
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issue is not ideal sequence, but whether a reader can readily locate
needed information. All the information relevant to a particular
topic should be placed in clearly labelled sections.19 Indeed, courts
have found unconscionable the placing of a contract provision in
an inappropriate section of the contract, such as placing an exclu-
sionary provision in "definitions" instead of in "exclusions."70
Legibility and coherence must be regarded not as ends in
themselves, but as means for enhancing semantic clarity, the most
important aspect of a written document. It is the substance of a
contract's terms that finally matters-that is, what the contract
means. Plain language legislation ultimately seeks to ensure that
the meaning of a written agreement will be easily available to both
parties, particularly to the individual consumer whose bargaining
power is weak and who must often accept either a standard con-
tract or no contract at all.
Four definitional principles can be found interlaced through-
out the various statutes:
1. A general, qualitative or descriptive standard, such as New York's




2. A comprehensibility test, by which some reader (either an "average" reader
or the consumer in fact) is determined to be able to comprehend the writing.
Typical is Maine's "average consumer" who should be able to "read and un-.
derstand the terms of loan documents without having to obtain the assistance
of a professional."
7 2
3. A quantitative (or "objective") test, such as the Flesch Reading Ease
Formula, which is designed to calculate reading ease through reference to the
length of sentences in the passage and the average number of syllables per
word.
7 3
4. A "features" standard, in which a list of specific traits of plain language is
provided; if the traits are present in the contract, it is deemed to be "plain."
Most statutes mix these standards, and in litigation it is likely that
sections" to mean that the text must "not give undue prominence to any one part." Com-
ment, supra note 16, at 771. "No undue prominence" is the wording in most insurance read-
ability statutes. "Undue" is merely a synonym for "inappropriate," however, so little is
gained by this interpretation.
69. Many statutes, especially insurance statutes, require a table of contents or an index
to aid the reader in finding information (though an index will not help if the information is
mislabelled). See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 175, § 2B (1) (d) (West Supp. 1981).
70. See C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
71. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (a) (1) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
72. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1121 (West 1980).
73. See R. FLzscH, supra note 2.
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all will be employed as arguments or evidence.
1. Clear and coherent. The "clear and coherent" standard re-
states the desired goal of plain language-to make meaning clear.
Many synonyms for "plain" can be adduced without shedding
much light on how clarity or plainness is to be achieved: "clear and
coherent," "easily understood," "accessible," "unambiguous,"
"comprehensible," and "clearly written to promote understand-
ing." All such variations describe plain language without providing
guidance for courts or for contract writers. 74
And yet objections to the clear and coherent standard on the
grounds that it is vague, subjective, or illusory seem misplaced.
Courts always have been and always will be taxed with determin-
ing the "plain" meaning of words in wills, deeds, statutes, and con-
tracts. It is a necessary fiction of the law that a single meaning for
each document "exists" that the court need merely uncover. Where
multiple meanings seem possible, courts will prefer the more "ordi-
nary" or "common" one.7 5 What happens, of course, is that courts
must often create (construct) that single meaning and give it effect
as the "plain" one. No matter how obscure or ambiguous the words
that express a meaning, courts must presume that the meaning ex-
ists awaiting the court's "clear and coherent" expression of it. Only
then can practical consequences result.
Thus, objections to the vagueness of a "clear and coherent"
standard are objections to the inherent difficulty of all linguistic
interpretation in legal matters. The standard merely requires of
contract writers that same degree of clarity which courts them-
selveshave had to produce in adjudicating among conflicting inter-
pretations of contractual language. If courts are already charged
with articulating what a document's plain meaning is, it does not
74. The District of Columbia bill elaborated more than most:
Words should be as simple as possible without sacrificing accuracy. This usually
means small words, but not always.
Sentences should be as simple as possible without sounding childish. This usu-
ally means short sentences, but not always. The writing must show evidence that
the writer tried within reason to avoid sentences so long or complicated that
readers have trouble following the ideas.
The Plain Language Act of 1979 §§ 401 (A) (i), 401 (B) (i). The District of Columbia propo-
sal was drafted in plain language and was spawned by Plain Talk, Inc., a Washington based
public interest group. Telephone interview with Ramsey Seldon, former president of Plain
Talk, Inc., October 14, 1980. See also Washington Post, Mar. 5, 1980, § C, at 3, col. 3.
75. See 17 Am. JUR. 2d Contracts § 247 (1964).
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seem a significantly new task for a court to determine that a docu-
ment in fact possesses plain meaning.
Furthermore, the "clear and coherent" standard may be more
realistic than other standards that create the illusion of a certainty
impossible to achieve given the ineffable variability of language.
An assertion about language almost inevitably turns back upon it-
self like a snake eating its own tail. A court declares that "where
the language of a contract is clear and not susceptible of more than
one interpretation, the ordinary plain meaning of the words must
be used.'"7 But if the language of the contract is "clear," whence
comes the interpretive dispute? What is "clear," of course, de-
pends upon many factors difficult to control or to measure-who is
reading a document, when it is read and under what conditions,
how attentive the reader is, or how familiar the concepts are, etc.
No Platonic ideal of semantic clarity exists.
The ideal that is sought is a language that requires no adjudi-
cation for the very reason that it is plain; if words and sentences
require adjudication, they are not plain. "The language mandated
by the Sullivan law should rarely require adjudication because the
'established' meaning of such language will derive from its common
and everyday meaning. If such language lacks common and every-
day meaning, it should not be judicially interpreted, but rather
should be rejected. ' " Logic of this kind suggests that no matter
how precise the articulation of standards for "plainness" may be,
circularity is unavoidable: it may be inherently circular to try. to
describe in language what language must be like.
Still, the fears of bankers, realtors, landlords and other users
of standard contracts that they may suffer concrete penalties for
violating an amorphous standard cannot be dismissed with a philo-
sophical shrug of the shoulders. The "clear and coherent" standard
may be little more than a wish for plain meaning, but when put
into a statute it becomes an enforceable mandate issued to writers
of consumers contracts. It is all too easy to say "I don't know what
plain language is, but I know it when I see it." Someone still must
produce plain language. And while a good faith defense may shield
76. Bryant v. Deseret News Pub. Co., 120 Utah 241, 242, 233 P.2d 355, 356 (1951).
77. Comment, supra note 19, at 832. The author also argues that if contract language is
given an adjudicated meaning, then by definition it "would no longer be clear and coherent
on its face to the consumer and should be deemed inappropriate for future use in consumer
contracts." Id. at 828 n.44.
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the banker or lawyer who tries but fails to write plainly, commer-
cial representatives have requested guidelines they can follow to
avoid stumbling into liability. 8
2. Intelligibility. Instead of merely describing plain language
with synonymous phrases, a statutory requirement that a contract
be understandable purports to measure the effects of language.
This requirement deems contractual language "plain" if it is un-
derstood by those for whom it is intended or by the "average con-
sumer." In many proposed statutes the intelligibility criterion ap-
pears in the "purposes" preamble, rather than in the definition of
plain language: contracts should be "in a form that is understanda-
ble to the average consumer. '79 Contracts should be "organized,
written and designed so as to enable a typical consumer without
special knowledge or training to be able to read and reasonably
understand the agreement and to be able to make an informed
judgment on the basic contract terms."8 Some states, however,
have explicitly rejected this standard. The New Jersey legislature,
for example, struggled with notions of "average person," originally
proposing to measure "average" by reading level (12th grade was
first proposed, then 8th grade), but finally eliminated the standard
altogether.8 1
Intelligibility criteria do not completely escape the circularity
of the "clear and coherent" standard. It would seem difficult to
determine whether a contract "promotes understanding" without
understanding the contract-and if one understands the contract,
it must promote understanding.
The more difficult questions, however, are whose understand-
ing is to be measured, and who is to do the measuring. It has been
proposed that actual readers be used as the measure of intelligibil-
78. At a public hearing held in Annapolis, Maryland, Oct. 16, 1980, representatives of
insurance companies, banks and savings and loan associations all supported the adoption of
specific guidelines in any plain language statute. Mr. William Weaver, President of the
Maryland Banking Association, argued that any plain language statute should "specifically
state the exact language of the contract in the statute itself." MARYLAND REPORT, supra note
13, appendix G (quoting from minutes of the hearing).
79. California Assembly Bill No. 1384 § 10701 (1979).
80. Florida House Bill No. 40 § 501.145 (1) (1980). The wording proposed by the Mary.
land Plain Language Study Committee, supra note 13, is a combination of the "clear and
coherent" standard and an intelligibility criterion: the contract must be "clearly written to
promote understanding of the contract by consumers." Maryland House Bill No. 1604, § 14-
1402 (1981).
81. N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1979, § 3, at 4, col. 5.
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ity either by testing the contract on sample readers from the target
group of consumers, or by relying on available empirical studies of
reading skills.8 2 Another means of assessing intelligibility is to em-
ploy expert readers to determine whether a contract is plain. Some
statutes permit documents to be submitted to a state agency, such
as a consumer protection board, or an insurance commission,' but
none specifically calls for submitting documents to "panels of ex-
perts" in writing or language. Clearly, an "expert" able to assess
plain language is not merely a person familiar with the technical or
legal language of the documents in question. Too much expertise
in insurance, for instance, can be a handicap in assessing the plain-
ness of insurance policies. One familiar with a particular kind of
discourse-with the terminology, the phrasing, the organiza-
tion-tends to read through the language to the "content." Famili-
arity breeds ease, and all readers comprehend language with which
they are comfortable better than they comprehend new language.
Intelligible contracts must make the unfamiliar concept plain to
average consumers. This is not to say, however, that the "common
and everyday" person is an "expert" in plain meaning. Average
readers also tend to read without awareness of the language itself.
The evaluation of language requires attention to the prose. Profes-
sional writers, editors and teachers (who have certainly evaluated
prose far from plain) learn to read with binocular vision, one eye
on the content, and one eye on the prose itself (though the ulti-
mate goal, of course, as with any good pair of binoculars, is singu-
lar clarity). "Panels of experts" are bureaucratically cumbersome
and expensive, to be sure, but valid evaluation of intelligibility or
"understandability" may be difficult otherwise."
3. Readability Formulas. Most insurance simplification stat-
utes require that documents achieve a minimum score on the
82. The New York Law Revision Commission proposes adding as a defense the actual
understanding of the contract by the complaining consumer. Memdrandum of the Law Revi-
sion Commission, supra note 16, at 1443. Maryland House Bill No. 194 (1981) contains a
provision that among factors considered in determining plain language are any "[s]tudies of
the educational level of the average customer by a business using a particular consumer
agreement." Id. § 13-3A-02(1). See also Givens, supra note 3, at 505.
83. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1126 (1) (West 1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-8
(West Supp. 1981-1982).
84. See State Laws and Standards for Clear Language, SIMPLY STATED No. 9, Sept.
1980, at 2 (newsletter of Document Design Center, American Institutes for Research).
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Flesch (or comparable) readability scale.8 5 This scale measures
readability by measuring quantitative relationships between the
average number of words in sentences and the average number of
syllables per word. The shorter the words and the shorter the
sentences, the easier a contract is to read. According to Flesch,
plain language scores a 60 (0 - most difficult; 100 = easiest) on
his scale, based on an average of around 20 words per sentence and
1.55 syllables per word. Most statutes require a minimum score of
40 (some require 50), a level roughly equivalent to a college gradu-
ate's reading skills (60 is the ninth or tenth grade level). A score of
40 has about the same difficulty as the New York Times or the
Harvard Business Review. The traditional automobile insurance
policy, Flesch shows, scores a mere 10, while the Internal Revenue
Code scores a minus 6-no surprise to anyone.8
While the Flesch formula is handy, consistent, and of some
validity, it is also misleading. By determining readability on the
basis of word and sentence length, the formula actually measures
reader sophistication more than document readability. Derived pri-
marily from data acquired in schools, where progressive reading
ability does follow increasing complexity of diction and syntax, the
formula ignores (as Flesch himself acknowledges) factors such as
the reader's familiarity with the subject, the context of reading,
diction and sentence patterns (classified other than by length), the
relative concreteness or abstractness of the diction, and even the
clarity that can be achieved in long sentences containing polysyl-
labic words. Conversely, short sentences with monosyllabic words
can be obscure, as is demonstrated by a common habit of bureau-
cratic writers in stringing nouns together like beads in a necklace.
Those who draft insurance policies or consumer contracts can in-
crease readability by raising their scores on the Flesch scale, and it
would be wrong to ignore such a handy measuring device. Yet it is
all too easy, as one commentator put it, to "write to the formula"
and miss entirely the purpose of plain language.
8 7
4. Lists of traits. Opponents of plain language statutes prefer,
if there must be a statute at all, the comfort of specific guide-
85. For an explanation of the readability scale, see R. FLESCH, supra note 2.
86. Id. at 26. The present essay scores 45 on the Flesch scale.
87. State Laws and Standards for Clear Language, supra note 84, at 2 (quoting David
Mellinkoff). See also Siegel, supra note 58; Bigolski & Frangie, supra note 11, at 15.
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lines."' These guidelines are sometimes listed as factors that a
court or state regulator may consider in determining whether a
document is plain."' In other statutes the guidelines are tests a
document must meet in order to comply.90 Connecticut requires
that a consumer contract "substantially comply with all" the items
in a list of nine criteria.91 If "all" means that failure to meet any
one of the items attaches liability, the test becomes quite strict.2
Connecticut's statute also lists eleven further items (essentially
constituting a readability formula) which, if "fully" met, prove a
contract is plain language.9 Some proposed statutes prohibit cer-
tain words like "whereas" or "hereto."" ' Still others require certain
grammatical or stylistic formulations (such as active voice and per-
sonal pronouns).9 5
A prohibition against "technical" language was included in the
first Sullivan Act, but this was dropped because certain so-called
technical terms do have common and everyday meanings, such as
"C.O.D." or "Pay to the order of." The fear was also expressed
that technical specifications (such as "f.2 lens" for cameras) would
be prohibited.98 This fear illustrates the danger of all specific
guidelines: the value of a technical term or a "legalism" or a partic-
ular grammatical form depends heavily upon context. The use of
88. Appendix G, MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 13 (testimony of insurance and bank-
ing spokesmen before the Maryland Plain Language Study Committee). See Goldstein,
supra note 10 (Bar spokesman believes that the New York law is itself vague and in need of
judicial interpretation).
89. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-10(a) (West Supp. 1981-1982).
90. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-152 (b) (West Supp. 1981).
91. Id.
92. See Semegen, supra note 13, at 45. Connecticut originally had more specific guide-
lines in its bill, but many were taken out before the bill passed. Clearly, It's A Problem of
Language, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1978, § 23 (Connecticut Weekly), at 18, col. 5.
93. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-152 (c) (West Supp. 1981).
94. Bigolski & Frangie, supra note 11, at 17. See also The Plain Language Act of 1979,
supra note 21.
95. The most specific grammatical instruction is in the California model bill, Bigolski &
Frangie, supra note 11, at 18: "'Such' shall not be used as an article to substitute for 'the',
'this,' 'that,' 'these,' or 'those,' as ip 'Such agreement is void.'" Such statutory instructions
may be excessively narrow. A concern expressed at the Maryland Public Hearing, supra
note 78, was that variance among specific requirements in state statutes would seriously
disrupt interstate insurance and banking business.
96. Comment, supra note 16, at 772-73. The Maryland Bill proposed by the Plain Lan-
guage Study Committee, supra note 13, explicitly allows "[t]echnical terms or terms of art
that cannot reasonably or readily be explained or qualified in the text." Maryland House
Bill No. 1604, § 14-1402 (B) (2) (1981).
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personal pronouns, for example, is much touted as a valuable aid
to comprehension, and is required in some statutes. The clumsy
use of pronouns, however can turn an "official" document into a
"chatty" note sounding so false that its import is not communi-
cated. When Citibank of New York pioneered the simplified credit
form, it employed the pronoun "I" to refer to the borrower, and
"you" to refer to the bank. As Flesch (who helped revise Citibank's
credit form) now admits, the practice sounds "phony. '97 More im-
portantly, it misrepresents the nature of a loan document: far from
being a personal note from a borrower to a bank, such a form con-
tract is a statement of rules the parties must follow. Bank after
bank followed Citibank's lead in using personal pronouns in a
manner inappropriate to the linguistic conventions governing this
particular communicative context.9 8
The principles by which semantic clarity is assessed ultimately
collapse into the "clear and coherent" standard. For example, New
York's allegation that the safe deposit box contract used by Lin-
coln Savings Bank was not clear and coherent mixed together the
principles of intelligibility, readability, and specific traits of plain
language.9 The bank used two documents in renting safe deposit
boxes to its customers, a receipt and a signature card, "which to-
gether. . . constituted the whole contract for the lease of said Safe
Deposit Box."' 0 The receipt contained on its reverse side the
"Rules and Regulations" which governed the contract. The State
claimed that the format and content of these Rules and Regula-
tions violated the plain language statute, and sought orders requir-
ing the Bank to reform the contract and pay $2,000 in costs.10 1 The
State argued:
1. The document was illegible because the print was too small (4 or 5 point
type), too many words (1200) were "crammed" onto a card 7-3/ by 2- in-
ches small, the paper was green and the layout had "inadequate spacing. '1 10 2
2. The document was not coherent because its paragraphs were unnumbered,
97. R. FLESCH, supra note 49-50.
98. Id.
99. State's Petition, State v. Lincoln Savings Bank YSup. Ct., N.Y. County 1980). See
note 56 and accompanying text supra.
100. Exhibit A, State's Petition, State v. Lincoln Savings Bank (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County
1980) (dismissed).
101. State's Petition at 10, State v. Lincoln Savings Bank. The costs were sought under
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 8303(b), not under the Sullivan Act.
102. State's Petition at 3-4, State v. Lincoln Savings Bank.
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similar subject matter was scattered throughout the document, and the topics
were neither captioned nor "logically ordered." 103
3. The document was not clear because it contained sentences that were un-
necessarily long (one had 121 words), it used words without common and
everyday meanings (e.g., "indemnify," "inferable," "attorney in fact"), and it
scored 32 on the Flesch readability scale.""
The State's petition contained as a second cause of action the un-
conscionability of the contract. Because the Rules and Regulations
were not easily readable, crucial provisions were "hidden,' 1 0 5 thus
preventing consumers from making reasonable decisions. This was,
said the State, "unconscionable and ... tantamount to a
concealment." 106
The New York "clear and coherent" standard may include all
those guidelines found in other statutes, and, in this sense, is the
most flexible and useful for protecting consumers. Despite the
claims of business representatives that precise guidelines are nec-
essary,107 the standards by which plain language is evaluated are
better left flexible so that they can be applied to a variety of lan-
guage uses. The very standardization of form contracts is a cause
of the problem plain language legislation seeks to solve. Form con-
tracts, like Lincoln Savings Bank's safe deposit box receipt, fail to
reveal anything clearly except their own rigid boiler-plate armor,
shaped to protect the bank. Statutes that read like handbooks in
English composition may bring comfort to commercial drafters,
but they do so only by substituting one form for another. Specific
guidelines become forms for forms-not workable tools for produc-
ing communicative consumer documents.
New York's law, therefore, seems to have been wisely drafted
in its generality. By stating the goal of the statute in its "clear and
coherent" standard, the legislature leaves the state (or private
claimants) free to seek relief for abuses not just of form, but of
intent and effect as well, while the more specific objective stan-
dards remain available as evidence to buttress the "clear and co-
herent" principle.
103. Id. at 5-7.
104. Id. at 7-8. An affidavit of Rudolf Flesch was submitted with the State's Petition.
105. State's Petition at 8, State v. Lincoln Savings Bank.
106. Id. at 9.
107. See note 78 supra.
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II. I labor to be brief, and manage to be obscure.
-HORACE, ARs POETICA XXV
The desirability of any plain language legislation, regardless of
its provisions, has been challenged on grounds ranging from practi-
cal concerns about cost to indignant bristling over the regulation of
cherished freedoms. 08 One line of argument follows the presumed
nature of legal language as distinguished from other forms of dis-
course. Legal language, the argument goes, has evolved through
centuries of case law and, while instances of poor writing can still
be gleaned from legal documents, it has generally become precise
and certain, designed to express complex ideas and to prepare for
litigable contingencies.109
These claims for "legalese" do not hold up well under analysis.
The vast history of litigation spawned by ambiguous wording be-
lies the claim that traditional legal language is more precise than
ordinary English. "Precision," especially in standard legal forms, is
often more a matter of repeating words and phrases once litigated
in a past factual dispute, than it is of tailoring language to present
circumstances. 10 Complicated rhetoric can create an illusion of
complex thought, obfuscating simpler ideas underlying an issue.
Complex legal ideas can and should be expressed plainly, espe-
cially in documents intended for readers who are not lawyers."'
108. The following suggest the range of objections-from the thoughtful to the rabid:
"[E]very insurance contract, airline ticket, hospital agreement, student tuition agree-
ment, deed & mortgage, even the plumber's agreement to fix the bathroom sink (if written)"
will have to be rewritten. Tyler, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1977, § A, at 20,
col. 3.
"The failings of the education system or the society at large are unfairly going to be
borne by the business community." Semegen, supra note 13, at 44.
The importance of a specialized legal type of language for the declaration of
legal principles and rights is apparent when it is considered how inadequate is
the plain and simple language of the average layman to express even his more
crude, everyday mental reactions. . . .The average person has small ability to
clearly say what he means or what he sees.
Morton, Challenge Made to Beardsley's Plea for Plain and Simple Legal Syntax, XVI ST.
B.J. ST. CAL. 103, 105 (1941).
"If two parties, or one of the parties to an understanding wants to communicate and
couch that communication or that contract of agreement in the most complex convoluted
terms, I believe that as Americans they have that constitutional right." Prather, supra note
10, at 399.
109. See Semegen, supra note 13, at 42; Comment, supra note 16, at 765.
110. D. MELLINKOFF, TiH LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 275, 294-95 passim (1963).
111. See R. FLEsCH, supra note 2, at 27. Flesch demonstrates, for example, that even
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Furthermore, common sense would suggest that the best way a
contract writer can prepare for contingencies is to make the agree-
ment understandable to those who must abide by its terms.
Nonetheless, as a practical matter, simplifying traditional con-
tracts is no easy task. Some of the practical difficulties reveal
deeper problems with the conceptual underpinnings of plain lan-
guage legislation as it has taken shape in the past three to four
years. These issues can be seen more clearly in the following hypo-
thetical drafting assignment.
A lending institution seeks to comply with a plain language
statute being debated in the state legislature. The member of the
bank's legal staff assigned to prepare a new consumer credit agree-
ment is told that it should be short, simple, and conform to the
"clear and coherent" standard of the proposed statute.
The drafter first rearranges the sections of the loan note where
the transaction amounts are listed; she separates and clearly labels
the various charges, and allows ample space for larger type size.
She then starts through the needed "terms and conditions," exper-
iencing little difficulty in simplifying provisions for the payment
schedule or delinquency charges. When she starts on the "prepay-
ment" clause, however, she is uncertain how best to proceed. The
bank's original prepayment provision, drafted before the Truth in
Lending Act, 12 reads as follows:
Upon presentation of payment to the Bank of not less than the full obligation
of Maker herein described or that portion thereof outstanding, in cash, new
loan, refinancing, or other equivalent value, not later than a date fifteen (15)
banking days prior to the last designated date such full amount shall be due
and payable on demand, Debtor shall be entitled to a rebated portion of the
total interest obligation herein calculated, provided that no such rebated in-
terest obligation shall not be more than one dollar ($1.00) and that the Bank
reserves the right at its discretion to deduct all reasonable processing costs
therefrom, the sum thereof not to exceed amounts described hereinunder in
paragraph 4 (a)(1) unless the Bank as stipulated hereinunder in paragraph 5
(b) deems and demonstrates a necessary exception thereto. 113
the most favored technique of tabulation (dividing documents into outline form), for all its
alleged logical rigor, does not necessarily eliminate ambiguity or produce readable docu-
ments. Id. at 103-04.
112. Pus. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146.
113. This clause is imaginary, but lest it seem merely a parody, here is an actual and
even more tortuous default clause:
In the event of default in the payment of this or any obligation or the perform-
ance or observance of any term or convenant contained herein or in any note or
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The clause shows all those marks of bad legalese that set consum-
ers' teeth on edge (if they even bother to read it). It is one long
tortuous sentence of 142 words; it contains exceptions within ex-
ceptions, double negatives, confusing crossreferences to other parts
of the document, redundant "referential barbarisms" like
"thereto" and "hereinunder." The only revisions made since Truth
in Lending was enacted were to replace "interest obligation" with
"FINANCE CHARGE," and to add after the word "calculated"
the parenthetical "(by the Rule of 78s)." It thus fits the letter of
Regulation Z's disclosure requirement, but hardly the standards
for plain language.11
The drafter next considers a shortened credit contract (from
the mid-1970's) that complies with Regulation Z without filling the
note with useless information:
1 5
DEPARTMENT NOTE
$ ..................................................... 19 ....
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I (we jointly and severally) promise to pay to the
order of
THE NATIONAL BANK (hereinafter called the "Bank")
the sum of Dollars ($ .... ) at any
office of the Bank, in_ consecutive monthly payments of which the
other contract or agreement evidencing or relating to any obligation or any col-
lateral on the Borrower's part to be performed or observed; or the undersigned
Borrower shall die; or any of the undersigned become insolvent or make an as-
signment for the benefit of creditors; or a petition shall be filed by or against any
of the undersigned under any provision of the Bankruptcy Act; or... then and
in any such event, the Bank shall have the right (at its option), without demand
or notice of any kind, to declare all or any part of the obligations to be immedi-
ately due and payable, whereupon such obligations shall become and be immedi-
ately due and payable, and the bank shall have the right to exercise all the rights
and remedies available to a secured party upon default under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (the "Code") in effect in New York at the time, and such other
rights and remedies as may be otherwise provided by law.
Quoted in Bigolski & Frangie, supra note 11, at 12 n.86.
114. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b) (7) (1981), requires
Identification of the method of computing any unearned portion of the finance
charge in the event of prepayment in full of an obligation which includes
precomputed finance charges and a statement of the amount or method of com-
putation of any charge that may be deducted from the amount of any rebate of
such unearned finance charge that will be credited to an obligation or refunded
to the customer.
(Emphasis added). For a discussion of the failure of disclosure regulations to inform con-
sumers, see Davis, supra note 54, at 842-43, 861-62 passim; Bigolski & Frangie, supra note
11, at 10 n.76.
115. Quoted in P. TILL & A. GARGIULO, supra note 13, at 22.
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first payments shall be $ .... each and the last payment shall be
$ . . The first payment shall be made on _ 19 and subsequent
payments shall be made on the same day of each month thereafter until this
note has been paid in full.
Whenever any payment hereunder is delayed ten (10) days beyond the
due date therefor, I (we jointly and severally) promise to pay to the holder
hereof on or before the next payment date liquidated damages of five cents
($.05) for each dollar of such delayed payment.
If any payment is not made hereunder when due, the entire sum owing
hereunder shall at the option of the holder hereof become immediately due
and payable.
Each party hereto, whether as maker, indorser or otherwise, hereby (1)
waives all demand for payment, presentment for payment, notice of dishonor,
protest and notice of protest and any and all extensions of time for the pay-
ment of all of any part bf the indebtedness evidenced hereby (whether by
means of a renewal note or notes or otherwise), (2) authorizes the holder
hereof to cause the signature of one or more makers or indorsers to be added
hereto at any time or from time to time, (3) agrees tht the holder hereof may
at any time or from time to time debit all or any part of the sum owing
hereunder to any deposit or account now or hereafter maintained by him
with the holder hereof even though this note be unmatured, without notice,
and without thereby affecting his liability hereunder for any part of the in-
debtedness evidenced hereby which is not so debited or~applied, and (4) if
this Note is not paid at maturity or upon default, agrees that all expenses of
collection hereof, including reasonable attorneys' fees, may be added to the
sum due hereunder, to be paid as a part thereof. Any unpaid balance may be
paid at any time and that portion of the Finance Charge in excess of $15 shall
be refunded based on the "Rule of 78's".
This too must be rejected as a model. Not only is the style still
legalese (it contains fourteen references of the "hereinunder" vari-
ety), but the prepayment information comes only at the end of a
complicated paragraph containing other provisions, thus violating
the plain language requirement that the document be "appropri-
ately divided and captioned."
11
The drafter then considers two other samples typical of the
mid-1970's, both clearly captioned as Finance Charge Refund
clauses:
If this loan is prepaid either by cash, new loan, refinancing or otherwise
before the final installment due date, the maker shall receive a rebate of
precomputed interest, calculated under the Rule of 78s.
117
116. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (a)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
117. The National Bank of Washington used this form prior to 1977. Quoted in Wash-
ington Post, Aug. 24, 1977, § D, at 1, col. 2.
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Buyer may prepay all or any part of the Total of Payments at any time.
Upon prepayment in full, Buyer will receive a rebate for unearned Finance
Charge calculated by the Rule of 78s (the "sum of the digits" method), pro-
vided that Seller may retain a minimum Finance Charge of $15.00 as acquisi-
tion cost, and provided also that no rebate will be made of amounts less than
$1.00.18
Both satisfy the requirement for a separate section, but are confus-
ing for other reasons. The first example is one sentence with con-
fusing syntax, because it is not immediately clear whether "pre-
computed interest" or "rebate" is "calculated under the Rule of
78s. ' ' 119 It refers to the consumer as "the maker," when many con-
sumers would probably think the bank "makes" the loan. It adds
unnecessary words by providing for all the contingent ways a loan
can be repaid-"cash, new loan, refinancing or otherwise ... .
The second example is more readable, and does refer to the con-
sumer as "Buyer," but the second sentence contains two excep-
tions, a double negative, passive voice, and complex syntax-all
forbidden under plain language legislation.120 Neither prepayment
provision is certain to meet the "clear and coherent" standard.
Furthermore,0 and far more troublesome than stylistic
problems, both clauses identify the method of calculating the re-
bate by the shorthand term "Rule of 78s." (The synonymous "sum
of the digits" helps little if at all.) Although such shorthand is per-
mitted under Regulation Z, and has been upheld in court, 21 it may
not meet the plain language requirement for words with "common
and everyday meaning." The New York statute originally con-
tained a prohibition against technical terms, but it was dropped for
fear that terms like "C.O.D." or "Pay to the order of" and the like
(which do have "common" meanings) might be banned. The attor-
ney general of New York in Lincoln Savings Bank did object to
118. "Typical" contract used by Davis in his survey of consumer understanding. Davis,
supra note 54, at 908-09.
119. Grammatically, the phrase "calculated under the Rule of 78s" refers to the entire
phrase "rebate of precomputed interest," and the comma after "interest" helps to empha-
size this. Technically correct grammar in itself does not always ensure clarity, however, as
Mellinkoff demonstrates in his discussion of litigated phrases that follow commas. D. MEL-
LINKOFF, supra note 110, at 371-372.
120. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-152 (b) (4) (West Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:12-10 (a) (1)-(a) (6) (West Supp. 1981-1982).
121. See Bone v. Hibernia Bank, 493 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1974); Gantt v. Commonwealth
Loan Co., 573 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1978). See also Davis, supra note 54, at 862 n.70.
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the legal terms in Lincoln Savings Bank's form contract. 2 Know-
ing that most lay persons and many lawyers do not understand the
"Rule of 78s," however, the drafter cannot be certain that the
phrase will qualify as sufficiently "common" or "everyday" to war-
rant its inclusion without explanation.
The drafter now sits down and writes a plainly worded para-
graph that tells the consumer that he may pay his loan off early,
that he will receive some of the finance charge back, and that the
amount of the rebate will be calculated by the Rule of 78. She next
writes "the 'Rule of 78' means . . ." She pauses. She is not cer-
tain what the "Rule of 78" means. Since she has always consulted
a chart in the bank's accounting department to figure rebates, she
decides to find some definitions of the Rule and incorporate one of
these into the sentence. She opens Clontz's Truth-in-Lending
Manual where she finds a reasonably clear explanation, but it is
three pages long and hardly appropriate for a short credit note.2 3
Clontz quotes a shorter version from a casebook:
The rule of 78's is based on the idea of a twelve-month loan repayable in
equal installments.
If the borrower takes out a $1200 loan, he has the use of 12 $100 bills for
the first month, 11 $100 bills for the second month, 10 the third month and
only 1 the last month.
The number 78 becomes the denominator of the fraction, while the nu-
merator depends upon when the prepayment takes place.
If prepayment was made at the 7th installment, 57/78 of the total finance
charge has been earned by the creditor. (The numerator is the sum of 12, 11,
10, 9, 8 and 7).12
But as Clontz himself points out, this is difficult to understand and
not likely to aid the consumer at all.
The drafter decides that a full explanation may neither be
possible nor desirable in a simplified contract.125 Perhaps the bet-
122. The Petition alleged: "The 'Rules and Regulations' use words which are not of
common and everyday meanings. Typical of the 'Legalese' is the following [sic] 'lessee'; 'at-
torney in fact'; 'conclusively presumed'; 'inferable'; 'power of attorney'; 'indemnify'; 'within-
mentioned term'." State's Petition at 7, State v. Lincoln Savings Bank (Sup. Ct., N.Y.
County 1980) (dismissed). See note 56 an.d accompanying text supra.
123. 1 R. CLONTZ, TRUTH-IN-LENDING MANUAL 6.01 [3] [a] (4th ed. 1976).
124. Id., at 6-4 to 6-5 (quoting B. CLARK & J. FONSECA, HANDLING CONSUMER CREDIT
CASES 67 (1972)).
125. One commentator suggests that another method of simplifying might be to refer
the consumer to a source in which the Rule of 78s is explained. Givens, supra note 3, at 508.
Few consumers have access to such material, however, and some plain language statutes
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ter approach would be to provide an explanation merely sufficient
to give the consumer a general and workable idea of the Rule of 78.
She might, for example, not even use the phrase "Rule of 78," but
instead put words in the contract that convey the idea that the
finance charge rebate will not simply be a sum of the unpaid
monthly interest charges. She could follow an example in a Prac-
tice Commentary which accompanied New York's General Obliga-
tion Law § 5-702, where a sample clause is offered:
PREPAYMENT: If I pay the full amount before it is due, I will be given
a refund for unearned FINANCE CHARGE figured as follows: First, I add
together the balances which would have been outstanding each month if I
had made all payments when they were due and not early or late. Next, I add
together the balances which would have been outstanding for each of the
months which I paid off by early payment. Finally, I divide the smaller total
by the larger one to get the percentage of the FINANCE CHARGE which
will be refunded to me.126
Such a clause employs what might be called the "instructional"
method of simplification. That is, it instructs the reader in how to
achieve the results of using the Rule of 78, without bothering him
with the term itself. The drafter correctly wonders whether such
instructions are clear, and whether they belong in a contract at all.
Will the consumer understand which figures to use? The words
"balances which would have been outstanding each month if I had
made all payments when they were due" could reasonably be inter-
preted as either the balances already paid or the balances for the
entire loan.
12 7
Remembering that various states expressly permit the use of
the Rule of 78 in calculating rebates, the drafter assumes that the
forbid confusing or ambiguous cross references. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56-12-10 (a)(1)
(West Supp. 1981-1982).
126. Givens, Practice Commentary [N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702] (McKinney's Supp.
1979-1980).
127. The "Practice Commentary" in N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKinney's Supp.
1979-1980) is a version of Givens, supra note 3. The prepayment clause printed in the latter,
however, seems more confusing than in the 1979-1980 "Practice Commentary" because the
"sums" the consumer is supposed to derive seem identical:
[F]or each month prepaid, I figure the balance would [sic-probably should read
"which would"] have been outstanding, if I had not prepaid and add together
each of such balances. Next, I add together the balances which would have been
outstanding for each of the months which I paid off by early payment.
Givens, supra note 3, at 509. Given's most recent "Practice Commentary," [N.Y. GEN. OB-
LIG. LAW § 5-702] 33, 38 (McKinney's Supp. 1980-1981) adopted this form, dropping the one
quoted in the text at note 126 supra.
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statutes must define the phrase; perhaps they could serve as mod-
els for a plain and clear contract clause. But she discovers that
statutes usually define the Rule as a proportion, a concept not eas-
ily grasped. Missouri's, for example, is very unclear:
[The Lender] shall give a refund of a portion of the amount of interest origi-
nally contracted for which shall be computed as follows: The amount of the
refund shall be as great a proportion of such amount of interest as the sum of
the full monthly balances of the contract scheduled to follow the installment
date after the date of prepayment in full bears to the sum of all the monthly
balances of the contract, both sums to be determined according to the pay-
ment schedule provided by the contract; provided, however, that if prepay-
ment in full occurs during the first installment period, interest shall be re-
computed and charged only for the actual number of days elapsed. 12 8
An average reader would find this passage difficult because of the
unfamiliar concept and the difficult syntax (twenty-one words sep-
arate a subject, "the sum," from its predicate, "bears"). Even
stated more clearly, as in Connecticut's Code,129 the concept of
"proportion" remains too abstract for easy verbalization. Language
which allows a reader to visualize concrete images or actions is
more comprehensible than abstract conceptual language.
The use of pronouns can render contractual language more
concrete. Readers can more easily imagine "I" and "you" than
"borrower" and "bank." A drafter might, therefore, adopt the the-
ory followed by Citibank of New York (and by many others) and
write the prepayment clause as if the consumer understood the
Rule of 78, and was writing to the bank to tell it so. The revision of
the prepayment clause from the National Bank of Washington
uses this Citibank tone:
If I pay this loan off in full, ahead of schedule, I will not have to pay the full
finance charge. I will pay a finance charge on the amount I have borrowed
only for the number of days I have had the loan-from the day I received the
loan until the day I pay off the loan.1' 0
128. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 408.170 [1] (2) (Vernon 1979).
129. The amount of [a refund based on early repayment of a debt] shall represent
at least as great a proportion of the total finance charge less an acquisition cost
of fifteen dollars, as the sum of the periodical time balances, after the date of
prepayment, bears to the sum of all the periodical time balances under the
schedule of payments in the original retail installment contract.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-96 (West 1960).
130. Simplified form adopted by the National Bank of Washington, quoted in Washing-
ton Post, Aug. 24, 1977, § D, at 1, col. 2.
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This version avoids mentioning the Rule of 78, and expresses (in
terms that sound highly favorable to the consumer) the effect of
calculating the rebate under the Rule. But it is not certain from
this version that the Bank is still using the Rule of 78. The effect
described sounds closer to the actuarial method of computing in-
terest. The two methods are similar but not identical, and the Rule
of 78 always produces a lower rebate than does the actuarial
method. 3 ' Regulation Z requires disclosure of the "method of
computing any unearned portion of the finance charge, ' 13 2 so this
Bank's explanation may be too ambiguous to comply.
The drafter also is puzzled by the use of pronouns in this ver-
sion. The consumer is referred to as "I" as if he were telling the
Bank about rebates. Presumably it is the Bank that understands
how rebates are computed. In writing a version like this one, the
drafter feels awkward using "I" for the consumer because she rep-
resents the Bank and it is the Bank which produces the document.
The resulting tone is self-serving, like an advertisement in which a
smiling consumer tells the bank how grateful he is that he will
"not have to pay the full finance charge." This pretense that the
consumer is writing to the bank may even be deceptive, implying a
comprehension on the consumer's part that he does not in fact
possess.
By now the tired drafter would much prefer to follow a sugges-
tion made by Davis on the basis of his empirical studies of how
well consumers understand contract terms. Davis found that men-
tioning the method of calculating the rebate made virtually no dif-
ference in the level of comprehension achieved by consum-
ers-what mattered was the idea of some finance charge refund if
the loan were paid off early. Consequently, Davis simply elimi-
nated any reference to the method of computation:
Prepayment: If I choose to, I may prepay the whole outstanding amount of
the Total of Payments at any time. If I do so, I will receive from Seller a
refund of the unearned FINANCE CHARGE.138
This seems quite simple and straightforward-even the use of "I"
is tempered by the third-person reference to the "Seller," which
131. See Hunt, The Rule of 78: Hidden Penalty for Prepayment in Consumer Credit
Transactions, 55 B.U.L. REv. 331 passim (1975).
132. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(7) (1981).
133. Davis, supra note 54, at 912.
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avoids the phony "letter to the bank" tone. Davis' theory of simpli-
fication relies heavily on deletion, getting rid of contractual terms
that serve no compelling need except the protection of the seller
from unlikely litigation. To this end, Davis proposes amendments
to the Truth in Lending Act which would substantially reduce the
required disclosures.13 4 Until such amendments are adopted, how-
ever, a drafter is still required to mention or to explain the method
of computing rebates.
After discovering no model that is fully satisfactory, the dis-
couraged writer must try her own hand at a plain language prepay-
ment clause. She decides to try two versions, one short and per-
haps less complete, the other longer and more thorough, but
possibly too long for a short-form agreement.
Short version:
PREPAYMENT: You may pay back this loan before the last due date, by
paying the unpaid balance and the remaining finance
charge. If you do this, we will refund any FINANCE
CHARGE that we have not earned, minus a $15.00
processing fee.
The amount of your refund will be figured according to the "Rule of 78."
This is a formula for calculating how much FINANCE CHARGE you actually
owe on the date you pay the loan back.
This version is clear as far as it goes, though it does not tell the
consumer how the Rule of 78 works, only that it will be the
method used. The concise explanation is legally sufficient under
Regulation Z, and perhaps gives enough information about the
purpose of the Rule to satisfy the "common and everyday mean-
ings" standard.
Long version:
PREPAYMENT: You may pay back the entire amount of this loan any
time before the last due date, by paying both the loan
balance and the remaining FINANCE CHARGE. If you
do this, we will refund to you a part of the FINANCE
CHARGE. This refund will be less than the sum of the
remaining monthly FINANCE CHARGES for two rea-
sons: First, we must charge a $15.00 processing fee. Sec-
ond, the amount of the refund will be figured according to
the "Rule of 78."
The "Rule of 78" works like this: the amount of FINANCE CHARGE we
134. Id. at 901-06.
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earn each month depends upon how much of the loan you still have. As you
pay it back, we earn less. For everybody's convenience, however, we divide
the total FINANCE CHARGE into equal monthly amounts. When you pay
us back early, we adjust the amount of FINANCE CHARGE you have paid
so that it matches the amount we have earned. The "Rule of 78" is the
formula for doing this.
Here is an example. Suppose you pay your loan and FINANCE CHARGES
all back on July 1, 1981 (prepayment date), instead of on January 1, 1982
(last due date). You would pay us $648.00 (remaining balance plus remaining
FINANCE CHARGE). Your refund is figured this way:





FINANCE CHARGE we earned




Although consumers may be reluctant to read an explanation this
long, it does abide by the requirements of the plain language stat-
utes and with most of the suggestions commentators have made for
writing plainly. The provision does not try to explicate the mathe-
matics behind the Rule of 78, but it does reveal the reason for its
use, and its effect on the refund. The phrasing is not loaded too
heavily in the bank's favor, and it employs personal pronouns hon-
estly by addressing the consumer as "you;" it uses common words
without sacrificing precision." 6 It uses active voice and simple syn-
tax, but avoids choppy (and patronizing) "Dick and Jane"
sentences. It contains an example, as Flesch recommends, and the
prose scores an 80 on Flesch's readability scale.13 7
Pleased with her work, the drafter is anxious to prove that
consumers can understand her prepayment provision. So she takes
the draft of the contract out to the front of her bank to test it on
some average customers. They read it, and appear to understand
135. The figures used here are based upon those used by Hunt, supra note 131, at 338.
136. The word "less" is used ten times more frequently in English than is the word
"minus," but the latter is far more precise. The requirement for common words should not
be met by blindly following frequency tables. V. CHARROW, LET THE REWRITER BEWARE 11
(Dec. 1979) (A publication of The Document Design Center, American Institutes of
Research).
137. R. FLEsCH, supra note 2, at 70.
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it. But they do have questions. Some are even angry. "You mean if
I pay this loan off in half the time all I get back is eleven dollars?"
"where does that 'processing fee' come from-that Rule of 78 must
be expensive!" "How come the bank gets nearly all the interest
when I keep the money only half as long?"
The contract writer is insulted. It seems perfectly clear to her,
but no one seems to quite understand. Most of the customers feel
better after she spends 20 minutes patiently explaining how inter-
est is calculated, but she could have done that with the old, ob-
scure contract. The only thing the plain language version has ac-
complished is to make consumers angry.
III. Care should be taken, not that the reader may
understand, but that he must understand.
-QUINTILLIAN, DE INSTITUTIONE ORATORIA
This sample drafting problem illustrates that plain language
statutes, as presently constituted, go only part way towards solving
the problems faced by contract writers and contract readers. Predi-
cated on the translation of a complex discourse into a simpler one,
a translation in which "meaning" ideally remains intact, the stat-
utes provide only superficial guidance. A drafter can meet the re-
quirements merely by mentioning necessary information, by com-
posing simple sentences with short words and pronouns, and
printing the contract in large type. But the deeper problem stems
from issues the statutes do not address: How is language actually
used in form contracts? What should be communicated in a form
contract? To whom and by whom? What linguistic or communica-
tive function do these contracts perform?
According to the common law of contracts, the second of the
above questions-what should be communicated in form con-
tracts-would be answered by phrases such as "what the parties
intended" or "what the parties agreed to do." The common law
doctrine cited as the basis for plain language legislation is that "a
party cannot be held to contract provisions not likely to have been
comprehended (and thus agreed to) by the party."""8 Courts that
have sought to protect consumers from adverse provisions in stan-
138. Givens, supra note 3, at 480. Givens also mentions the corollary doctrines that a
contract will be construed against the drafting party, or against the party with'an imbalance
of bargaining power, or the party represented by counsel when the other is not.
1981]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
dardized contracts often buttress this doctrine with "plain lan-
guage" arguments. That is, in deciding whether to enforce a con-
tract provision, courts have often considered factors such as
clarity, conspicuousness, appropriate captioning, and ordinary
meaning-the criteria found in plain language statutes.
In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,139 in which an implied
warranty theory was applied to a form contract, the court refused
to enforce a clause limiting an auto manufacturer's liability, find-
ing that the limitation was misleadingly inserted in a "warranty"
clause, that the clause was in fine print (the jury could decide that
"the type of print itself was such as to promote lack of atten-
tion"140), and that the phrasing of the provision was not clear:
In the context of this warranty ... the phrase "its obligations under this
warranty being limited to making good at its factory any part or parts
thereof" [would not] signif[y] to an ordinary reasonable person that he is re-
linquishing any personal injury claim that might follow from the use of a
defective automobile. Such claims are nowhere mentioned. The draftsman-
ship is reflective of the care and skill of the Automobile Manufacturers Asso-
ciation in undertaking to avoid warranty obligations without drawing too
much attention toits effort in that regard. No one can doubt that if the will
to do so were present, the ability to inform the buying public of the intention
to disclaim liability ... would present no problem.",
In C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.,1 42 the
Iowa Supreme Court refused to enforce a clause in a theft insur-
ance policy that required "visible marks" of "force and violence"
to be found on the exterior of the burgled safe. The factors render-
ing the provision unenforceable included: its inclusion in the pol-
icy's "definitions" section instead of "exclusions;" its violation of a
common law duty to define limitations or exclusions in clear and
explicit terms; and, its violation of the principle that a contract's
language must be interpreted from the viewpoint of the ordinary
person,- not a specialist or an expert-the evidence of burglary
cannot depend only on the contract's definition of "burglary"
but also on "the layman's concept of burglary . . .or the legal
definition."1 34
139. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
140. Id. at 339, 161 A.2.l at 92.
141. Id. at 400, 161 A.2d at 93.
142. 227 N.W.2d 169 (1975).
143. Id. at 173. See also Ferguson v. Phoenix Assurance Co. of New York, 189 Kan. 459,
370 P.2d 379 (1962).
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In the New York case of Gross'v. Sweet144 the court cited the
state's plain language statute as the standard for provisions in a
contract that would limit liability. A parachute jumping school in-
cluded in its agreement with students a "Responsibility Release"
in which the student "waive[d] any and all claims that I . . .may
have against [the school] ... for any personal injuries or property
damage that I may sustain or which may arise out of my learning,
practicing or actually jumping from an aircraft. '145 The court
found this language "opaque" and insufficiently clear to inform the
student that he could not sue for injuries caused by the school's
negligence. Such limits on liability must be, the court said, "ex-
pressed in unmistakable language" that is both unambiguous and
"understandable as well. . . .Of course, this does not imply that
only simple or monosyllabic words can be used in such clauses.
Rather, what the law demands is that such provisions be clear and
coherent (cf. General Obligations Law § 5-702).14e
Plain language statutes, then, extend common law principles
designed to protect weaker parties against the imposition of unfair
terms, especially in standardized contracts. To this end, the stat-
utes aim at redressing the balance between parties by trying to en-
sure that the weaker party understands the terms so that he or she
can make a reasoned decision to accept or reject the contract. By
requiring that the contract be in the consumer's own "language,"
the statutes would offset the economic power of business with the
free and informed choice of consumers.
This theoretical basis for plain language legislation, derived
from traditional contract law, may suffer from the same conceptual
uncertainty that has marked all courts' efforts to deal with stan-
dardized contracts; it applies a contract remedy to documents
that, in every real sense, are no longer contracts. Standard forms
144. 40 N.Y.2d 102, 400 N.E.2d 306, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1979).
145. Id. at 109, 400 N.E.2d at 310, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
146. Id. at 107-08, 400 N.E.2d at 309, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 368. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court brought standardized contract clauses using "archaic and technical language beyond
the easy comprehension of the consumer of average intelligence" under the state's Unfair
Practices Act. Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 482, 329 A.2d
812, 828 (1974). The court did not hold that use of such language constituted an unfair
business practice, but it rejected a lower court's dismissal of such a complaint and remanded
the case. On remand that issue was not decided because of an insufficient record. For the
sequence of three cases, see Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 10 Pa. Commw.




easily turn into contracts of adhesion, profferred on a "take it or
leave it" basis. No meaningful bargaining can take place when all
credit agreements, leases, insurance policies contain virtually the
same standard clauses. Contract theory contemplates "dickering"
over terms; contracts of adhesion prevent dickering over most, if
not all, terms. Contract theory further presumes that both parties
express their voluntarily formed intentions in the document; adhe-
sion contracts express the intention of the stronger party to which
the weaker consumer must assent, often without considering or
even reading the contract's terms. 147
By imposing the terms under which transactions will take
place, large economic entities can, in effect, promulgate laws gov-
erning consumer behavior. Because of this rule-making power,
standardized contracts must be regulated more effectively than
courts can regulate them on an ad hoc, contract-theory basis.
Llewellyn challenges the traditional role "assent" can play in ana-
lyzing contract disputes: "Instead of thinking about 'assent' to
boilerplate clauses, we can recognize that so far as concerns the
specific, there is no assent at all. . . [except] a blanket assent...
to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on
his form."1 4
Keeton points out that state insurance commissions do not
prevent policies from being contracts of adhesion because "most
insurance policy provisions are still drafted by insurers. ' 149 Kirby
calls for standard lease forms to be codified in statutes,50 and
Slawson would apply principles of administrative law to at least
the unbargained boilerplate terms in adhesion contracts.151 Slaw-
son further points out something of particular importance to
"plain language" solutions to adhesion contracts: most standard
147. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITON: DECIDING APPEALS 362-70 (1960);
Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REv. 961
(1970); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 629-31 (1943); Kirby, Contract Law and the Form Lease: Can Contract
Law Provide the Answer? 71 Nw. UNIV. L. REV. 204, 212-24 (1976); Slawson, Standard Form
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REV. 529, 529-31
(1971).
148. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 147, at 370.
149. Keeton, supra note 147, at 966-67. The model insurance readability statute pro-
posed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), and followed in
most states is a good example of Keeton's argument.
150. Kirby, supra note 147, at 237.
151. Slawson, supra note 147, at 541.
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contracts are not even meant to be read. "If sellers really intended
to bring the adverse terms of their forms to consumers' attention
they could readily do so in the same manner in which they adver-
tise their products' desirable features.'
1 52
We need not rehash further these analyses of adhesion con-
tracts to see how inadequate a plain language statute is in protect-
ing consumer interests from the rule-making power of business.
The contract doctrine of assent is the prop by which plain lan-
guage legislation would uphold consumers' power to resist adhe-
sion. If the language is readable and comprehensible, the contract
can be "assented" to or not; free and meaningful choice is returned
to the consumer once he understands what he is signing. But the
simplification of a standardized contract does not make it any less
standardized. The consumer may be in no better a bargaining posi-
tion if the clearly expressed terms are standard everywhere and
cannot be dickered over.153 This is not to say that plain language
statutes fail entirely to address the evils of adhesion contracts: ad-
verse terms would be plainly stated so that consumers can at least
discover them--"to be intelligible is to be found out," as Oscar
Wilde said. But the discovery of adverse terms is helpful only if
the consumer is free to reject them. No matter how brightly pol-
ished for clarity a boilerplate provision may be, it is still adhesive
if no meaningful alternative exists. That plain language legislation
will increase choice is therefore a questionable hope. 1' Under
traditional contract theory, plain language statutes could be de-
scribed as ameliatory, designed to free parties to make voluntary
agreements. In truth, however, plain language statutes will succeed
only if they are treated (and drafted) as overt regulatory measures
aimed directly at the content of adhesive provisions in form con-
tracts. They should seek to regulate not merely by exposing ad-
152. Id. at 544-45.
153. See Comment, supra note 16, at 779.
154. -Plain Language statutes can present dangers as well as protection for consumers.
The simplification of a contract may remove consumer rights: the New York State Con-
sumer Protection Board reported that many simplified leases "forced tenants to surrender
almost every right given to them under state law." N.Y. Times, supra note 29. Plainly writ-
ten but adverse terms could be defended by the claim that because the contract complies
with a plain language statute, the consumer can be presumed to have understood it. "Per-
versely, the improvements in language could undercut a consumer's traditional defense of a
lack of understanding of the legal language." Levine, My Client has Discussed Your Propo-
sal to Fill the Drainage Ditch with his Partners: Legal Language, in L. MicHAELs & C.
RicKS, THE STATE OF THE LANGUAGE 409 n.15 (1980).
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verse terms to the withering light of clear expression, but also by
prohibiting those terms which cannot be made easily accessible to
average consumer understanding. What the statutes should do,
and what one opponent feared they already do, is "attempt to reg-
ulate and, in a sense, dictate the most basic relationship between
consumer and supplier, that is the content of the actual written
contract itself.1
155
In order to see why plain language statutes would be better
framed as overt regulations rather than as attempts to re-create
traditional contractual freedoms, standardized contracts must be
examined in the light of an appropriate theory of language. Just as
the statutes may be grounded in an inappropriate legal theory
(contract law), so too are they rooted in an inadequate linguistic
theory. Essentially, plain language legislation assumes that "mean-
ing" is contained inside the words and sentences of a document,
and that if the words and sentences are simple enough, the mean-
ing can be extracted. But meaning is not something trapped inside
the cage of language waiting to be liberated. Meaning is produced
in the acts of creating and of perceiving a written document.
Meaning results from actions governed by the manner and context
of their performance, as well as by the ideal semantic "content" of
words and sentences. Identical words can have different effects in
the world, that is, different meaning, according to the act per-
formed when they are spoken or written (and heard or read). If I
order someone to "close the door" he or she may or may not do it
depending upon whether the act of ordering is appropriate to the
context. A request, a plea, a hint, many acts other than an order
may be far more effective and meaningful.
The language theory that tries to account for meaning as it
results from performed linguistic actions is called "speech act" the-
ory, and is derived primarily from the work of the philosopher J.L.
Austin." 6 Austin pointed out the simple truth that when we use
language we.do more than assert truth or falsity. We also perform
acts in the world. Some acts, in fact, occur only when language is
employed in certain ways; Austin called these "performatives."
Acts such as promising, warning, appointing, and commanding all
155. Semegen, supra note 13, at 42.




depend upon saying certain words in certain contexts. By saying "I
promise to go to the dance" I have performed a promise; without
the words, there is no promise. 157 Linguistic acts have conse-
quences as do other kinds of acts-a promise can be as legally
binding whether manifested in spoken words or in the signing of a
document. 158 Meaning thus arises from the acts that language is
used to perform as well as from the references words have in dic-
tionaries. A sentence may be an assertion, but it may also be an act
such as a promise, an order or a warning. In order to describe lan-
guage accurately, Austin persuades us, we must consider what it
does.
Language acts depend heavily upon convention, upon the ex-
pectations people have about the acts others are performing. Lan-
guage functions in an elaborate context of conventional expecta-
tions which deeply influence what we are able and willing to
comprehend. Comprehension does not depend merely upon the
words perceived, or upon the sentences composed, but also upon
the "rules" governing the act being performed. If a speaker utters
a promise in a language only minimally comprehensible to the
hearer, the hearer will understand if she perceives that a promise is
being made, that is, if the conditions for a promise are present.
Rules can be deduced for speech acts which, if followed, will deter-
mine whether the given act is successfully performed.1
59
Speech act theory suggests two conclusions relevant to plain
language theory: first, no attempt to regulate language can ignore
the act performed by that language, and, second, intelligibility de-
pends heavily upon a sharing of conventions about language acts.
In order to regulate the language of consumer contracts, plain lan-
guage statutes must take into account what contract language
does. Adhesion contracts do not merely communicate, or express a
meeting of the minds. More often they regulate behavior. They tell
157. Austin of course recognized that a promise can be inferred from behavior other
than verbal behavior. J. AUSTIN, supra note 156, at 8-9.
158. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 249 (2d ed. 1972). Verbal acts have always been recog-
nized as having legal significance beyond the abstract "content" of their words. Verbal acts,
for example, are allowed into evidence as exceptions to the hearsay rule because of their
"performative" significance.
159. Necessary conditions for successful promising, for example, include: (1) reference
to a future act that (2) the hearer would prefer the speaker to do and (3) it is not to be
assumed that the speaker would have done the act in the normal course of events without
the promise. J. SEARLE, supra note 156, at 63.
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the consumer what he may or may not do. It is not merely by
chance that "contracts" for leasing a safe deposit box are called
"Rules and Regulations." This is as true of plain language docu-
ments as of the old-fashioned obscure lease used by Lincoln Sav-
ings Bank.1 0 The consumer is being governed as to what he may or
may not do with a safe deposit box. A truly clear lease must make
this governance clearly known; a genuinely plain document cannot
pretend to be a contract freely assented to. If known to be a rule-
promulgating document, a contract can be treated as such accord-
ing to appropriate conventions, just as a promise known to be such
can be understood and treated according to conventions appropri-
ate to promising.
The preconceptions and conventions consumers bring to a
given document profoundly influence their ability to understand
what they read. If the conventions are known and familiar, little
explanation is needed to make the document "plain." No elaborate
explanations need appear on the face of a check, even though the
law supporting a phrase like "Pay to the order of" is quite com-
plex, because the conventions of check writing are familiar. Any
attempt to explain a provision in a contract that works against
preconceived notions will be difficult, no matter how simplified its
language. Davis, in studying consumer understanding of contracts,
found that consumers better understood those concepts that ful-
filled their expectations than they understood unfamiliar concepts,
whether the concept was in typical or in simplified language. No
amount of simplifying produced full comprehension of a concept
which ran counter to the conventions of the transaction. Thus, the
concept of "default" caused by nonpayment was easily compre-
hended in both kinds of contract language. However, the other
ways one can default-such as moving the collateral-were under-
stood poorly in both kinds of language. There exists a strong con-
ventional belief that one "defaults" on a promise to pay money
when, and only when, one does not pay that money. The other
causes of default are not part of the conventional context for bor-
rowing money, and would have to be explained at great length to
160. Safe deposit box leases that complied with the Sullivan Act were offered as exhib.
its by the State in State v. Lincoln Savings Bank, and these documents were also titled
"Rules and Regulations." Exhibits E and F. State's Petition, State v. Lincoln Savings Bank
(Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1980) (dismissed).
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be understood.161 Similarly, the retention of rights even if the con-
tract is assigned made little sense in either version, perhaps be-
cause the concept is appropriate to the legalities of loans but not
to the consumer's conventional expectations. 162
This is not to say that gains cannot be made by simplifying
contract language. Davis' statistics show an increase in comprehen-
sion when a simplified contract is used.6 3 But the conclusion Davis
draws from his study is not that greater and greater simplification
is called for, but rather that we must assess the value of contrac-
tual information by the behavior it addresses, because that has
more to do with understanding than does language simplification.
He believes the inclusion of specific information is necessary only
if a consumer would be likely to rely upon it: "An item of informa-
tion is valuable enough to justify its forced disclosure only if it
would influence materially the conduct of a reasonably conscien-
tious consumer."16' Thus, contracts are simplified by the deletion
of superfluous material.
Davis, however, does not follow the thread of his study to its
logical conclusion. Adhesion-contract analysis, speech act theory,
and empirical evidence such as that reported by Davis all imply
much more than that certain provisions need not be disclosed in
consumer contracts. Rather, the issue is one of applying a doctrine
of reasonable expectations to all provisions in standardized con-
tracts. If a provision is too unfamiliar, too difficult to explain, too
unrelated to the conventions normally governing behav-
ior-including linguistic behavior-of a contractual context, then it
161. See Davis, supra note 54, at 876-77.
162. Id. at 884-85 n.119.
163. The average percentage of correct answers to questions about the contracts rose
from 44.5% for the "typical" version to 55.9% for the simplified version. Id. at 876.
164. Id. at 897. See also Givens, supra note 3, at 506. Among Davis' proposed amend-
ments to the Truth in Lending Act are the following.
Any form note or other evidence of indebtedness to be signed by the obligor
shall utilize simple and readily understood language throughout and shall in-
clude, in addition to any required disclosures, only those terms that are essential
to the relationship of the parties. [To be added to §§ 128 (b) and 129 (b) of the
Truth in Lending Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1638 (b) and 1639 (b) (1970)
respectively.] "Terms that are essential to the relationship of the parties" means
those types of obligations and conditions that are actually relied upon with
meaningful frequency by the creditor or like creditors, including any such obli-
gations and conditions as are provided by law. [To be added to § 103 of the
Truth in Lending Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1602 (1970).]
Davis, supra note 44, at 901 (footnotes omitted)(original in italics).
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should be found for that reason to be inappropriate to the kind of
transaction in question. The language of contracts cannot be de-
tached from the behavior involved, as plain language statutes tiy
to do. Instead of requiring plain expression of provisions, no mat-
ter how adverse, plain understanding and plain expression should
become standards for evaluating the contract provisions
themselves.
It is hardly a revolutionary idea to suggest that "reasonable
expectations" be a standard for the just enforcement of contract
provisions. Courts now evaluate a contract's terms according to
whether the terms fit within the implied conventions of a transac-
tion. Doctrines like "implied warranty" or "implied fitness of hab-
itability" are the application of conventional expectations to con-
tract terms. The Iowa court in C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied
Mutual Insurance Co.165 described a doctrine of reasonable expec-
tations about insurance by holding that "[t]he objectively reasona-
ble expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding
the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated
those expectations."1 6 Slawson makes a similar argument that a
promisee should only be held to whatever he or she manifestly con-
sented to, regardless of subjective consent. If a person signs "a re-
ceipt" she cannot be reasonably held to other complex terms con-
tained in the document, but only to the implications of a "receipt"
as this is conventionally understood.67
It is here, in notions of reasonable expectation, that plain lan-
guage legislation must find its justification. Yet this is the reverse
of the statutes examined in Part I of this essay. The mere transla-
tion of obscure contract terms into plain contract terms will not
address the problem of what standardized contracts do: direct,
govern, and regulate consumer behavior. Instead of elaborating
definitions and formulas for readability and clarity, plain language
legislation should be part of extensive regulation of standardized
contracts. The ease with which a contract's provisions can be
plainly expressed should become the standard by which such pro-
visions are deemed enforceable. Whether a provision can be clearly
165. 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
166. 227 N.W.2d at 176 (quoting R. KnEoN, INSURAN E LAw-BASIC TEXT 351 (1971),
quoted in Rodman v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Iowa 1973)).
167. Slawson, supra note 147, at 543-44.
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expressed and easily understood is a factor in determining whether
it fits reasonable expectations. A provision should be deemed en-
forceable only if it bears a reasonable relationship to behavior ex-
pected in the context of the consumer transaction in question; and
the provision's "reasonable relationship to behavior" can be deter-
mined, in part, by whether it is expressible in simple, clear lan-
guage. Businesses are free, of course, to try to change what is "con-
ventional," as they do all the time through advertising. But that
which cannot be expressed easily, that which is not yet sufficiently
conventional to be easily understood, should have no place in stan-
dardized consumer agreements. The requirement of plain expres-
sion should govern the terms-not merely the words-of the con-
tracts a consumer signs.
Flesch ends his book How To Write Plain English with a vi-
sion in which a consumer, after reading a plain language contract,
not only understands it but also decides that he will not assent to
its terms even if they are standard.""8 But plain language should
affect those who write the contracts as well as those who read
them. Our hypothetical contract writer might have her own vision.
After grappling for a full day" with the Rule of 78, and producing
nothing fully satisfactory, she might decide in a moment of insane
clarity that the Rule of 78 should not be used in consumer loans
because it is too difficult to explain. s9 Until the phrase "Rule of
78" becomes as conventionally understandable as "C.O.D." or "Pay
to the order of" or "receipt," the Rule may not be a fair method of
calculating prepayment rebates on consumer loans. The drafter
may be fired, of course, for suggesting to her bank's president that
the Rule be abandoned; but she might be right: the contents of
plain language documents should reflect how language is used, not
how it has been abused.
An honest tale speeds best being plainly told.
-SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD III, IV, Iv
168. R. FLESCH, supra note 2, at 123.
169. She would not be alone. See Givens, supra note 3, at 504 n.28. See also P. TiL &
A. GARGIULO, supra note 13, at 42. The Rule of 78 has come under strong attack as unfairly
imposing a hidden penalty for prepayment. See Hunt, supra note 131; Comment, Rule of
78's and the Required Disclosures Under Regulation, 23 U. KAN. L. REv. 709 (1975); Com-
ment, Consumer Protection: Truth-In-Lending Disclosure of the Rule of 78ths, 59 IowA L.
REv. 164 (1973); for a creditor's view on the rule, see Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation:




N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-702 (McKinney Supp. 1981)
§ 5-702. Requirements for use of plain language in consumer
transactions.
a. Every written agreement entered into after November first,
nineteen hundred seventy eight, for the lease of space to be occu-
pied for residential purposes, or to which a consumer is a party
and the money, property or service which is the subject of the
transaction is primarily for personal, family or household purposes
must be:
1. Written in a clear and coherent manner using words with
common and everyday meanings;
2. Appropriately divided and captioned by its various sections.
Any creditor, seller or lessor who fails to comply with this subdivi-
sion shall be liable to a consumer who is a party to a written agree-
ment governed by this subdivision in an amount equal to any ac-
tual damages sustained plus a penalty of fifty dollars. The total
class action penalty against any such creditor, seller or lessor shall
not exceed ten thousand dollars in any class action or series of
class actions arising out of the use by a creditor, seller or lessor of
an agreement which fails to comply with this subdivision. No ac-
tion under this subdivision may be brought after both parties to
the agreement have fully performed their obligation under such
agreement, nor shall any creditor, seller or lessor who attempts in
good faith to comply with this subdivision be liable for such penal-
ties. This subdivision shall not apply to agreements involving
amounts in excess of fifty thousand dollars nor prohibit the use of
words or phrases or forms of agreement required by state or fed-
eral law, rule or regulation or by a governmental instrumentality.
b. A violation of the provisions of subdivision a of this section
shall not render any such agreement void or voidable nor shall it
constitute:
1. A defense to any action or proceeding to enforce such agree-
ment; or
2. A defense to any action or proceeding for breach of such
agreement.
c. In addition to the above, whenever the attorney general
finds that there has been a violation of this section, he may pro-
ceed as provided in subdivision twelve of section sixty-three of the
[Vol. 30362
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executive law.
L.1963, c. 576, § 1, formerly.§ 5-701 (b), (c); amended L.1977, c.
747, § 1; renumbered § 5-702, and amended L.1978, c. 199, § 1.

